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IN 7HE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UT,'\H

-oooCRANE COlli' ANY dba CRANE
SUPPLY COl1PA!lY I

)
)

)

PlaintiffAppellant,

)
)
)

vs.

)

Case No. 15022

)

KEN DAHLE 1 MARV ERICKSON,
EA~L ZARBOCK, PLUMBERS
SUPPLY COt1PANY, ALAN !1ASER,
MARJIE SADLER, and DOES I
through X,

)
)
)
)
)
)

DefendantsRespondents.

)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF

RESPOUDE~>ITS

STATEME:->IT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks a modification of the judgment entered
by the trial court.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOlVER COURT
On ~1ay 6, 1~76, the Honorable James Sawaya signed
a tenporary restraining order restraining respondents from
soliciting customers and suppliers of the appellant.

On May

14, 1976, a hearing on appellant's motion for a preliminary
injunction was heard before the Honorable G. Hal 7aylor and
said notion for a prelininary injunction 'vas denied.
On

Hay

19,

1976,

appellant

initiated

and

filed

a
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motion for reinstatement of temporary restraining order or,_

'··

preliminary injunction with the Supreme ~ourt of the State o;
Utah.
motion

After argument was heard from both parties
was denied on June 14th, 1976.

appellant'

Beginning on July ll,-

1976 this case was tried without jury before the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft.

The lower court found that there was no cor-

spiracy to injure appellant's business and no unfair competit;
but did award damages in the form of restitution for the vale
of two sales diverted from appellant.

Judgrnen t 1vas granted

only as against respondents Dahle, t-1aser, Erickson and Plumk'
Supply and not against respondents Zarbock and Sadler.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the findings
of the lower court and

judgment therein.

IHTRODUCTO~Y

S'I'ATENENT

The present case concerns the change of employment·::
appy_ and desJ
four individuals, the respon d en t s, Who Were Unh
·
h lp.
·
of improving their employment re 1 atlons

They

D_.

erf armed

certain acts in preparation for their change of employment

r:

the lower court found that those acts did not constitute a c:,
.
f responrlents fidur:
spiracy to injure appellant in violatlon o
ary duty.
Thef main issue before the court is whether the )owe:
b the lo
the facts found Y
court e-iil ~ in concluding froM
~rr-"'
c."""'

that
no conspiracy
existed.
court
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The facts and conclusions found by the lower court are
contained in both the findings of fact and the court's memorandum decision.

Since the findings of fact and conclusions of

law are inadequate for the reason that they are incomplete
and void of many facts and conclusions found by the lo\'rer court
that are relevant to the substantive issues

~n

appeal

herein,

this court may properly consider the memorandum decision together with the findings of fact and conclusions of la1v.

This

proceedure is stated in Sparague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co.,
4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689

(1956) where this court stated in

a footnote at page 693 that:

"An opinion or memorandum of decision
filed bv a court sitting as trier of the
factAand conclusions of la\\ 3.re inadequate.
If the opinion or memorandum contains the
findings of fact, that is sufficient."
Appellant in its brief and statement of facts alleged
facts that \'Tere not found by the lower court.
contended

by

It is also

respondents that appellant's attempt to argue

facts not found by the lower court is improper since this
court is not the trier of fact '"'hen the case before the court
is a case at law.

This is discussed further in respondents

argument herein below.

However, realizing the possibility

that this court may classify the present case as a case in

-3- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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equity, the respondents have also presented argument up~
that premise, although keeping in nind the statement
by this

court

made

in Kier v. Condrack, 478 P.2d 327 (1970), at

p. 329 that:
"Although this court may review the facts in
this case in equity, it should be kept in
mind that we may do so in the light of the
evidence as believed by the trial court, and
not necessarily as urgued upon us from the
point of view of the defendants (appellants)."

-4-
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STATE!1ENT OF FACTS
A.

Rule 75

(p)

(2) Statement.

Appellant, Crane Supply has set forth in its brief a
statement of facts.

In compliance with Rule 75 (p)

ents Dahle, ~aser, Erickson, Zarbock and Plumbers

(2), respondSupply indi-

cate below to what extent appellant's statement is inconsistent
with the facts.
1.

Respondents disagree with most of appellant's first

paragraph on page 2 of its statement of facts.
(a)

It is correct that April 20, 1976 was Dahle, Haser

and Erickson's last day of employment with appellant.

However,

the record indicates that on said date said respondents gave
a two-weeks notice (TR 1-29; 2-52;3-61; Findings of Fact No. 2)
but due to appellants policy to terminate salesmen the same day
they give their notice (TR 1-28) said respondents were not
asked to stay and work said two weeks (TR 1-30).

Further,

the record is silent as to any specific prior arrangement by
respondents to terminate although Haser and Erickson decided
during the last week of April, 1976, to terminate with appellant
and seek employment with Plumbers Supply (TR 2-63; 2-77) •
(b)

Dahle did contact Zarbock at the end of Harch

1976 in regards to employment but was not offered a position
until after April 16, 1976, with final terms being made nuring
the last week of April 1976 (TR 2-16,17).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(c)

The record is clear that no orders for waten,c:.l

materials were placed for Plumbers Supply by Dahle or any re•. 1
I

pondent prior to

~1ay

3, 1976

(TR 2-12;

2-45;

2-112; 2-12 41 "

that the one order to Clow Corporation (Plaintiff 1 s Exhibit '
6-p) although back dated was in fact ordered Hay 11, 1976
(TR 2-124, 125, Exhibits 24-D and 12-D).

Further, Plumbers

Supply had an inadequate inventory in waterworks on 'lay 3, i,.:
and had to order from competitors including appellant to sat:q
orders received after Hay 3, 1976

(TR 2-127).
I

(d)

Although Dahle participated in the input ford
I

lant 1 S projection of sales

(TR l-61) and ordered inventory,:,

specifically made efforts in April 1976 to sell overstocked
items and maintain an appropriate inventory
2.

(TR 2-16,17).

Respondents agree with most of appellant 1 s seco::l

paragraph of its statement appearing on page 2 and 3; however!
the form notice

(Exhibit P ·2) 1vas only mailed to some of ao:•l

lant 1 s customers of which some were also customers of Plwnberl
Supply with the majority being sent to Plumbers Supply custo:j
(TR 2-142; 2-145).

Further, said notice had an effective dat:'

of May 3, 1976, and was mailed on April 29th and 30th in ant:·!
cipation of respondents being fired when they gave their two·l
weeks notice (TR l-80).
3.

1

Respondents agree with most of appellant s thir.

paragraph of it statement of facts appearing on page
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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3 althDC

the first sentence is not factual.

It is correct that Dahle

was asked in February 1976 to prepare sales books but said books
contained very little information (TR 2-14) and were neither used
by Dahle, 11aser or Erickson nor of any value to them as salesmen
(TR 1-49;

2-15, 53

&

78).

I t is not correct to state that appel-

lant had explicit procedures in regards to bid quotes since
neither Dahle, Maser nor Erickson had any knowledge of any
relevent policy of appellant and rarely used or kept any copies
of quotes prepared (TR 1-46, 47; 2-8).
4.

Respondents disagree with most of the fourth para-

graph of appellant's statement of facts beginning on page 3.
It is correct that Maser and Erickson threw their sales books
away (TR 2-53; 2-74) since said books did not contain any information that was not retained by appellant in its office (TR 2-15).
It is correct that Dahle disposed of the extra copy of a print-out
only because it had been marked up and was no longer usable to
appellant (TR 2-50).

It is not correct that respondents left

any catalogs in the warehouse or that the sales book or extra
copy of the printout were necessary for appellant's business.
On the contrary nothing '"as taken or destroyed by respondents
that was necessary for appellant to continue its business.

The

only i terns taken by respondent 1-1ere hand written notes and junk
which were returned to appellant prior to the hearing before
Judge Taylor

(TR 2-2,3)

(transcript of hearing on preliminary

injunction p. 99)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5.

Respondents agree tVi th most of the fifth par;:,

of appellants statement appearing on page 4, except for the:
statements in regards to the notice and the ordering of in,1,,,
which have been contraverted in paragraph 1 above.
Plumbers

Su~ply

had previous to/Aay 3, 1976 dealt with and:.

chased from some of said suppliers
6.

Further,

(TR 2-110, 123).

Respondents agree \vi th the sixth paragraph of

appellant's statement appearing on page 5.
7.

Respondents disagree tVi th most of the seventh

paragraoh of appellant's statement appearing on page 5. Da'.
gave input to appellant for projections (TR l-61) and did
keep ap;::>ellant' s inventory down as above mentioned.

1\?pelk

statement concerning typical lead time is directly contradic:,
to the record as referred to by appellant (TR 2-46).
8.

Respondents disagree with most of the eighth~'!

graph of appellants statement appearing on page 5.
statement that res;:>ondent Plumbers Supply had not

ADDellan:,

pre~~ouslr!

been in the water works business is not true and directly co:·l
tradictory to the record.

Plumbers Supply had been in the

1

I
sewer and \vaterr,rorks business for over 10 years and a compeL·-~
of appellant and had started to increase their waterworks
business over a year before Dahle contacted Plumbers SupplY
for employment (TR 2-11, 122, 123).

Plumbers .Su?ply had a]so

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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previously dealt with and bought from most of the suppliers of
waterworks materials (TR 2-110, 111, 112 & 123).

Appellant,

as a new venture approximatelY" 8 years ago with inexperienced
personnel, in approximately 60 days, attained sales figures
similar to those projected by respondents (TR 3-68, 69).

In

regards to the inventory of Plumbers Supply the record is
clear that Plumbers

Sup~ly

purchased a large portion of their

inventory in May, 1976 from their competitors including
appellant because of their own inadequate inventory (TR 2-127, 128).
The majority of appellant's statements in this paragraph are
speculative and are not supported by facts.
9.

Respondents agree that appellant's controller

testified as to its loss as mentioned in the ninth paragraph
of appellant's statement appearing on page 6.

Hmvever, the record

indicates that said estimates \vere J:>ased on sales of the first
four monthsof 1976 and not on sales for a similar period during
1975 (TR 3-49, 50).

Further, the record is silent as to whether

the loss to appellant was gross profits or net profits.
Appellant's controller also testified that the estimated loss
was due to the loss of employees and would not have been as
great had appellant replaced their lost employees (TR 3-48).

10.

In regard to the tenth paragraph of appellant's

statement ap?earing on page 6, respondents agree that an order
lvas placed by Bountiful City with appellant for 200 meter boxes,
however, ap~ellant fails to mention that Dahlein connection with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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s<~id

order did prepare another ticket for the other 150 box:

while employed by appellant and gave it to another employee,
appellant since Dahle did not order meter boxes while
by appellant (T:E'l. 3-65, 66).

emplo~··

Contrary to appellant's statene:

Bountiful City was not advised that said boxes were not

bac~.

ordered and in fact believed they were still on backorder,;:,,.
they placed an order \vi th Plumbers Supply (TR 2-70).
B.

Respondents Statement of Facts.
The trial court recognized in its memorandum deCJS;

the controlling facts of this lawsuit.

However, out of an

abundance of caution, respondents have set forth many non·
controlling

facts above to counter the inaccuracies and

omissions of appellant's statement.

However, respondents

believe that the below statement of facts is sufficient to
enable this court to decide this appeal:
l.

Appellant's business here involved was a whole:'!
I

\vaterworks division that dealt solely with municipalities an•'
utility contractors on a competitive bicl. basis (memo der:. p.l!
All of appellant's waterworks customers were listed in putli:
directories and accessable to and dealt Hi th all coJT1,petitors '
(TR l-74, 75; 3-54, 55).
2.

Dahle

was a sales manager

(TR 1-44), ·~sera~

, k son were sa 1 esmen ( T.R 2 -~-1 , 73) and Sadler was a secreta:
Er1c
(TR 2-87) for appellant.

There 'vere no employment contracts

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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involved and the association was an employment at will (memo
dec. p. 4) .
3.

Prior to April 30, 1976 appellant knew of Dahle's

dissatisfaction with his job (TR 1-76; memo dec. p. 1) and that
Maser, Erickson and Sadler were unhappy and did not get along
with appellant's office manager (TR 2-62, 76
4.

&

95).

T"ha t on April 30, 1976, Dahle, Maser, Erickson and

Sadler gave their bm weeks notice of termination but were terminated the same day by appellant (paragraph A.l. above).
5.

Prior to Dahle's termination on hpril 30th,

1976, he performed the following acts:
(a) Contacted Zarbock during the end of March concerning employment and was offered a job sometine after April
16, 1976 (TR 2-128; memo dec. p.2)
(b)

Discussed with Zarbock the feasibility of

expanding Plumbers Supply waterworks business (TR 1-63; memo
dec. p. 2) .
(c)

Helped prepare a form notice (Exhibit P 1-2)

announcing a change of employment effective Hay 3, 1976 (findings
no. 4).
(d)

Did not make sure the 150 meter boxes ordered by

Bountiful City were back ordered.
(e)

(TR 3-60,96}.

Took several orders for appellant on April 30,

1976 (TR 1-82).
(f)

Cleaned

up all possible problems for appellant

Sponsored by
the S.J.1976
Quinney Law
Library.
Funding for
digitization
by the Institute of
Museum and
Library Services
on April
30,
(T~
1-83,
84)
andprovided
continued
after
termination
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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:..n-

to assist appellant with its problems and help appellant'sc

0

(TR 1-84 through 86).
6.
(a)
2-63, 77

&

96;
(b)

Prior to or upon his termination Dahle

did nc:

Coerce other respondents to terminate (T'l. l-1':
memo dec. p.2).
Overstock appellant's inventory (TP, 2-16;merr.o',

(c) Solicit appellant's customers or divert any
orders of a?pellant (TR 1-82; 2-18; memo dec. p.4).
(d)

Take any materials

(other than his own misce::,·f

neous handwritten notes that were returned) belonging to
appellant (TR 2-3) cr use any of appellant's materials 1qhile
employed with Plumbers Supply (TR 1-86).
7.

Subsequent to

his termination, Dahle did acce::l

:·1

and deliver an order for the 150 meters from Bountiful Cit1'
hP. believed was on back order. with aPpellant
8.

(TR 3-60, 96 ) .

Prior to t1ay 3, 1976 Zarbock contacted and ne~·;

otia tied with suppliers in regards to increasing the watenvo:'i
business at Plumbers Supply (TR 2-110, 123) and made prepara::l
including financing to increase said business
Zarbock

(T'l. 2-130, 13;).

advised Dahle to give two weeks notice and alloiVed

form notice to be mailed upon belief that other responde~!
\vould be terminated upon giving notice
9.

(T~ 2-129) ·

Prior to his termination, Maser individuallY

and without the knowledge or consent of any other respondent
(TR 2-18) cancelled an order for a valve and suhsequentlY
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

~ '' 1

said order with Plumber Supply (TR 2-56) although said valve
was never purchased from Plumbers Supply (Findings of Fact No.6).
Maser also threw away his sales book (TR 2-53).
10.

Erickson upon termination turned over important

material to an employee of appellant and made certain that jobs
in progress would be taken care of (TR 2-75, 85) and did not
take or destroy any material that would be useful to appellant
to carry on its business (TR 2-78).

He did throw away his

sales book (TR 2-74).
11.

None of the respondents solicited the customers

of appellant prior to their termination (memo dec. p.3).
12.

Appellant's suppliers and customers were still

available to it and appellant was neither deprived nor prevented
by respondents or their acts from continuing its dealings with

its own customers and suppliers

(TR 1-33, memo decision p.3).

Appellant had the material, information and man power to continue its business.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

APPELLANT'S APPEAL FOR LEGAL RELIEF LHUTS THIS
COURTS SCOPE OF REVIE\'7.
It is well settled law in Utah that this court, in
cases at law tried before the court without a jury, will only
examine the evidence as is necessary to determine questions of

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
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law.

Further, that this court will not pass upon the suffic:,

of the evidence to justify the findings or judgment, or subs·
·I

another evaluation of the evidence, unless there is no legitr.
proof to support the findings or judgment.

In no cases

at~

either with or without a jury, will this court determine quest.,
of fact, but may in equity cases.

~:

Lyman v. Town of Price,

90, 222 P. 599; Sine v. Salt Lake Transport Co., 106 Utah

2~

147 P. 2d 875; Pixton v. Dunn, 120 Utah 658, 238 P. 2d 408;
and Article VIII Section 9 of Utah Constitution.
Since

under Utah law both actions at law and actic:

in equity can be consolidated in one action it is sometimes
difficult to ascertain whether the case on appeal is one of
equity or law.

Such is not the case here for it is clearly

evident that the relief sought on appeal by appellant is leg;:
relief of damages for an alleged tort and not equitable relie'
The distinction to be made is whether legal relief is sought
rather than equitable in determining whether the appeal is~
the case at law or one in equity.

In 27 Am Jur 2d Sec. 112 ,.

page 637 it states that:
" .•• That the suit is held to be juticable at
law, and not in equity, where the purpose thereof
is the recovery of damages lvhich have been su~- ,,
tained by reason of fraud, a fraudulent conspuacl
or a breach of a fiduciary duty."
(See also Ambler v. Choteau, 107 US 586, 27 L ed 322, S ct W
and Koeon v. Corpeiro, 200 A2d 708.)

Appellants are seeking

damages which they alleged were sustained by an alleged con-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

spiracy and breach of a fiduciary duty and this kind of relief
is clearly legal relief and as such limits the scope of review
on appeal by this court.
This court is not required as suggested by appellant
to review the evidence and make its inferences therefrom, and it
would appear to be improper in an appeal on a case at law to
argue the evidence presented in the lower court as appellant has
done.

The critical issue before this court is one of law as to

~hef"___!h~ _f_a~!s _9~ound_]?y

_the lower court support the lo,.,er

court's de_cision _tllat _respondents did not conspire to injure
aEpel~a_11t'

s bus:i,I}ess and _there-fore appellants were not entitled

to darnagE!S other than those

_ctw_ard~d.

This court's scope of

review is limited to those facts found by the lower court and
not those inferences and bits of evidence urgued upon this court
from the point of view of the appellant.
Respondents submit that the lower court's judgment
was in conformity with its findings and should not be disturbed
(Mason v. Mason, 160 P.2d 730 (1945).

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOU)ID THAT THERE T·7AS NOT
A CONSPIRACY BY RESPONDENTS.

Although the trial court awarded damages against more
than one res2ondent, appellant's effort to construe this as
evident of a conspiracy is not supported by either the facts
of the present case or the courts memorandum decision.

It is
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correct that

~1aser

individually and without the knowledge of

any other respondent diverted an order for a valve and that
Dahle was not very careful in making certain that appellant
received an order for 150

~eter

while employed by appellant.

boxes that Maser helped 0 ~~

The record is clear that these

two acts were independently done and that only one responden:
participated in each of the acts.

However, the recor<'! also

indicated that Plumbers Supply received a benefit from the sa:'
of the meter boxes.

The facts of the present case support L

conclusion that judgment should have been entered only again:
Maser, Dahle and Plu:nbers Supply for the loss due to the salE
of the 150 meter boxes to Bountiful City and judgment agains:
only Haser for the diversion of the valve order.

The court

below in its memorandum decision did not explain its reasonr
for awarding the judgment as it did, and respondent's counse:
inadvertently failed to object to the joint judgment upon
grounds stated above.

t~:

It is apparent that a substantive

basis for the court's award of a joint judgment lvould have
been the unjust enrichment realized by Plumbers Su!)ply upon
the sale of the 150 meters to Bountiful City and the potent:
sale of the valve.

There is no basis for a conclusion ~a

conspiracy and the court below correctly found, "th"lt there:·

.
pondents were not involved in a conspiracy to defraud (appe.
of its customers and business •.. nor ..• planning to injme~
destroy (appellant's) business in the particular field here
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

involved"

(memodec. p.3)
Appellant's

attempt to torture the court's memo

decision into supporting a conspiracy not only miscontrues the
decision but is an ex~ercise in false logic.

Appellant's argu-

ment in point 1 as supported by the cases cited therein is
based on the major

p~mise

that in a conspiracy all partici-

pants are liable for the damages ensuing from the wrongful act.
Appellant's minor

premise~ is that damages were awarded jointly

against more than one respondent, and therefore appellant's
conclusion is that there was a conspiracy.
Appellant's argument fails for the following reasons:
1.

There is no evidence in the record to show that

the respondents participated together in any wrongful acts.
2.

The court below founn there was no conspiracy

therefore there must be another basis for its joint damages.
Such a basis would be unjust enrichment.
3.

Appellant's conclusion is false since conspiracy

is not the only basis for awarding joint damages.
Neither the fact that the court below failed to
explain its awarding of damages nor the failure of respondents' counsel to correct the a?parent mistake of the joint
judgment is sufficient basis to establish a conspiracy \'lhen the
evidence fully supports the opposite.

-17Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POPTT
":'HE FINDINGS OF F.li.CT OF

ITS CONCLUSION

III
THE T'\IAL COURT SUPP0RT

THAT RI:SPO:lDEN'T.'S DEl NOT CONSPIRE TO IllJTJRE

APPELLANT IN VIOLi\TION OF THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTY.

It appears to be settled law that although an emolchas a fiduciary duty to his employer he can make preparations
for future employment and upon termination com:oete for and
solicit his former employer's customers.
697)

(see 55 Am Jur 2d Ss

Two crucial issues that appear in the majority of cases

are first >vhether certain acts prior to termination constitute
solicitation or preparation and second whether those acts
are in violation of a fiduciary duty and injure the employer.
(see 28 ALR 3d 7)

The above two issues were carefully conside:l

by the court below as it heard the evidence presented and dre:.
its inferences and conclusions therefrom.

It is submitted tri,·

as this court considers thecourt'sfindingsitwill be conpelle:
to the same conclusion that the respondents did not conspire
to injure appellant's business hut were only desirous of i~
proving their employment and being able to continue to earn a
living in a free and competitive economy.
Appellant in its brief cites Hoggan
Inc. v. Hall, 18 Utah 2d 3, 414 P. 2d

89

&

Hall

& Hig~

(1969) and Duane~

Company, Inc. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (195 41,
cited by this court with approval, as authorities on the issue
of what constitutes a conspiracy to injure another's business
and what acts constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.
In the Hoggan case this court held that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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follo~Vi:

acts prior to the termination of the defendant, a director of
plaintiff's corporation, of personally contacting five specific
advertising accounts or customers that

he serviced for the

plaintiff and advising them that the plaintiff was in trouble
and the customers should let him service them in the future and
that the other accounts were going with him,constituted a breach
of a confidential relationship and a solicitation of the accounts.
The Hoggan case is clearly distinguishable from the
present case upon the same basis that the majority of cases in
this area have been decided (see 28 ALR 3d 7).

The key issue

is the solicrlation of customers while still under a fiduciary
duty as an employee.

There was no finding in the present case

that the respondents personally contacted customers of the appellant and solicited their business while still in
employ.

a~pellant's

In fact, appellant's only allegation of solicitation

is that respondents sent a form notice one day prior to their
termination to some customers of appellant advising them of
respondents change of employment.

The notice

was to be

effective after termination and there is no finding

that any

of appellants customers received said notice prior to respondents termination date.

It is settled law that prior to his

termination an employee has the right to make arrangements and
preparations to compete with his employer upon termination and
to advise his employer's customers that he is severing his
present relationship and going into business for someone else
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(See Am Jur 2d Sec. 697, p. 26 and Restatement of Agen9: 2c
Sec.

393 comment "e .. ).

A good case

on point and one quoted v1ith consisL

in this area is Continental Car-na-var Corporation v. Hose!;
24 Cal. 2d 104, 148 P 2d 9 (1944), where the district manage:!
the former employer sent out a form letter to approximately,,
of the customers of the former employer advising them that r.; 1
leaving the plaintiff and assuming the position of sale mana:
of another corporation.

The court held that the defendant r.; 1

the right to advise customers of the plaintiff that he was
severing his business relations with the plaintiff and wu
engaging in business for himself.

(Also see Aetna Bldg.

Main~e:j

Co., Inc. v. Nest, 39 Cal 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 [1952].)
Another case on point ann one relied upon by appelL
is Southern California Disinfecting Companv v. Lomldns, 183
App. 2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr.

43, 53

(1960).

C;

The court in thatd

also stated that an employee may advise his custoners that heJ
changing employment, prior to termination thereof, by means c'
!

cards and orally telling the cusotners of the change.

The ke·.

issue in that case •.vas again the solicitation of custoJTlers pr::
to termination.
a rel1e:
In Duane Jones Company, Inc., v. Burke, supr'

I

upon by appellant, the court held that the acts discussed bel;·
of solicitation of specific 3.ccounts prior to ternination was
violation of a fiduciary duty.

1

The Duane Jones case is clear~

distinguishable from the present case on the basis of solid'.

terrninatio~.'

tion.
In that
case
defendants
prior
to andtheir
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incorporated a new business, personally contacted specific
accounts, pre-sold them on their plan to either buy out their
employer or take all the accounts with them upon quitting, and
solicited and acquired those accounts for the new corporation
while still receiving pay as employees of the plaintiff.

Whereas,

inthe present case, no customers were personally contacted or
pre-sold prior to termination, and there was no predetermined
course of action whereby the respondents would acquire appellant's
confidential customers prior to setting up a new business and
thereby destroy appellant's business.
The distinguishing issue that the courts in Duane
Jones and other cases have wrestled with is what acts prior to
termination are just preparation for new

ernplo~ent

and not a

breach of a fiduciary duty or a conspiracy to destroy anothers
business.

As discussed above, sending out a notice of changing

employment is not a breach of a fiduciary duty.

Further,

the

negotiations between Zarbock and Dahle, Maser, Erickson and
Sadler for new employMent and their giving their two

weel~s

notice on the same day are neither a breach of a fiduciary duty,
for the reason that said acts are necessary for any change in
employment, nor a conspiracy to destroy appellant's business,
sincG thev '•'ere emoloyed hy will.
responden-~s

':'he followinc:: cases support

ryosi =:ion.

In Fidelity, Company vs. Federal, Company, 217 Cal.
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307, 314, 18 P.

2d 950 953, the California Supreme Court madE

the following stateQent:
"That the defendants 1vere free to leave the
employ of plaintiff and engage in a similar
business there can be no doubt.
For men to
agree and plan to enter business as associates
even though they have a design to draw their
patronage from many rivals, or all that a
particular rival may have does not constitute
them conspirators.
Practically every copartnership, corporation, or private individual
which enters into business does so with the
intent of drawing all the business it possibly
can from all competitors.
If it were not so,
there would be no such word as 'competion' in
business."
Also, in United Aircraft Corporation v. Boreen,(B'
dapa) 284 F. Supp. 428, where defendants attempted to and die
lure from the plaintiff's employment valuable employees to
work with a newly formed competitive corporation, the court
held that even though injury to the former employer might hav:1
been reasonahly foreseeable, the plan to form the competing
corporation, even though the defendants acted in concert and
secretly, manifested an intention of the defendants to better
their own lot rather than
employer.

an intention to injure the former

The court 1vent on to state that the crucial fact

was that the defendants were all employed at will and that i'
an outside employer wishes to obtain the services of such emvJ
he can do so as long as he does not attempt to induce wrongfU:
conduct by the former employees.

There was no f indingf in the

present case that Zarbock induced any wrongful conduct by t)<
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respondents.
In Spring Steels, Inc., v. Maloy, 400 pa. 354, 162 A
2d 370 (1960), where the former employer's vice-president conceived an idea of a new competing business and pursuaded

other

employees to go along with him and even conceived the plan of
resigning in a group and it was alleged that said action constituted a conspiracy to cripple plaintiff's business,the
court held that those acts did not constitute a conspiracy and
stated:
"That since there was no formal contract of
employment, that to enjoin a former employee
from entering into such employment as he
wishes is in the nature of a restraint on
one's liberty."
Restatement of Agency, 2d Sec. 393 comment "e" does
suggest that it is a breach of a duty where a number of officers
or employees agree to leave simultaneously and without giving
the employer an opportunity to hire and train replacements or
as a tool of extortion to seize the business as was evident in
the Duane Jones, supra.

However, in the present case the respond-

ents gave a two weeks notice, would have stayed to train new
personnel and assist in the transition, and even after being
terminated continued to help appellant serve its customers.
Further, appellant was left with employees capable of continuing the business.

Said comment "e" also states that before

termination an employee can make arrangements and preparations to
compete with his employer upon termination.

The right to make
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preparations is further supported in United Aircraft Cornorc
v. Boreen, supra where the court said;
"That even though i t is certainly not in
the employer's interest to have the employee
begin preparation to compete while still in
his employ, this kind of derogation from the
general notion of loyalty is not an actual
breach of fiduciary duty".
Appellant alleges in its brief that Dahle breache:
his fiduciary duty by discussing with Zarbock the feasibilit
of his employment with Plumbers Supply and the availability
of suppliers.

Appellant relies on Southern California

Disinfecting Company v. Lomkins, supra.

The Lamkin case is

also clearly distinguishable from the present

ca~.

In tha:

case the plaintiff's customers were found to be confidentia'
and the defendant's use of and conversion of the customer lii'
and his solicitation and diversion of sales was considered t
the court as "trade secret larceny".

Further, the defendant

assistance to the new employer was not mere advice as was
Dahle's but the conversion of confidential information and
diversion of customer orders prior to termination.

In the

present case the customers of appellant were not confidenti:
and Dahle neither converted confidential information nor us:
t h e same to esta bl ~s h a competlng b uslness.
0

o

0

~_he
findings
c' 1
'
~

court below estab-' ished that: Da!-·.le rraintc:ined an appropriate
inventory while in appellant's employ and did not make anY
specific inventory orders for Plumbers Supply until after h:
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termination.

His only act was that of giving advise on the

feasibility of obtaining inventory and increasing the business.
Th2

findings showed that the information concerning

the suppliers of waterworks was public knowledge and that the
additional suppliers were obtained by Zarbock without the use
of any of appellants information.

As was mentioned above an

employee can prepare for a change of employment and it is a
common business practice to at least have some indication you
can provide a service before you offer it.

Dahle's help with

suppliers was indeed only preparation since the relationship
between appellant and said suppliers was not affected at all.
Appellant further alleges in its brief that respondents converted and destroyed documents and records of appellant
to further respondents business interest and destroy appellant's
ability to compete.

Appellant again relies on Southern Calif-

ornia Disinfection Company v. Lomkins, supra.
between that case and the present
a conspiracy to injure are again

The distinctions

case of what acts constitute
quite clear.

In the Lornkin

case, the defendant, prior to termination, converted information on confidential customers contained in a route book and
stuffed blank pages in said book to deceive plaintff and give
defendant more time to use said information and solicit
customers.

Some of the information defendant took was not

contained on the records in plaintiff's office.

In the present

case respondents did not take anything prior to termination
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and did not use any confidential information of appellantt
solicit customers of appellant either before or after termir:
It is true that Erickson and Maser threw away their

sales~

but the evidence shows that the books were of no value
the salesmen, had limited information of which some was

~

out~j

and that the names and addresses contained in the books were
contained on the print outs and other records available in t
office of appellant.

There was no finding by the court that

dicated the loss of said books damaged appellant's ability
continue to compete.

t

In fact the record indicates that all

important information on jobs in progress was left with appe:
lant and respondents continued after termination to help apr'
lant in those jobs in progress.
There was no finding by the court that any of appelt
jobs in progress were effected by any acts of the respondent
or that respondents used any information
obtain any of said jobs in progress.

of appellant's to

These facts clearly di:

tinguish the present case from Abbott Redmont Thinlite

Cor~·

ation v. Redmont, 475 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1973), relied uponb'
appellant.

In that case the defendant while working for P~

tiff persuaded architects to write in plaintiff's product
specification in their bids and then defendant quit plaintW
and used the information on specifications to submit his bic
and to secure the contract.

The court's holding that defend:

viola ted a fiduciary duty was based on the "tangible expectc:
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that the plaintiff would have received the contract had the
defendant not used the confidential information of his bid.
In the present case the respondents did not receive any orders
or contracts that appellant expected to receive through the
use by respondents of appellant's information.
The respondents did take with them the skill and
knowledge they obtainedwhileworking for appellant but they
are entitled to that.

In Matthews Paint Company vs. Seaside

Paint and Lacquer Company, 148 Cal. App 2d, 168; 306, P 2d 113
(1957), where salesmen learn the names and addresses of their
former employer's customers as well as their individual and
specific requirements and needs respecting the type and
quality of lacquer products desired by such customers and
used said information to compete against their former employer,
the court held that a salesman necessarily becomes somewhat
acquainted with the particular requirements of his

customers,

but that the knowledge that he obtains in this manner is not
in and of itself confidential information which is the property of the employer, when the information could have been
acquired by any of the former

employer's competitors and

might have been as well known to the competitors as they were
to the former employees.

Another case on point is Vendo Co.

v. Long, 213 Ga 774, 102 SE 2d 173 (1958), where the court held
that customers, equipment, prices, price quotations, new
machines, method of doing business and procedures were not
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trade secrets nor confidential information for the reason
that they were not particular to the plaintiff's business
and known only to it and its employees.

The court

furth~

stated that the employee has the right to take with him
upon termination all the skill he has acquired, all the
knowledge he has obtained and all the information that he has
received so long as nothing is taken that is a trade secret
or property of the employer.

Even more on point are the word:

of the court in Revcor, Inc. v. Fame, Inc. 85 Ill. App. 2d
350, 228 NE 2d 742

(1967), where the court stated that;

"Our free economy is based upon competition,
that one who works for another cannot be compelled to erase from its mind all of the general skills, knowledge, acquaintances and the
overall experience which he has acquired during
the course of his employment, and that the
success of a person who was engaged in sales
depends largely upon his personal friendships
and the confidence inherent therein, such a
person cannot be prevented from seeking out
customers of his former employer when he
has entered into a competing business or
gone to work for a competitor."
Dahle took with him his !mow ledge of how to deal ' 1
suppliers and how to manage a waterworks business.
were his to use to better his lot.

These ski

Haser and Erickson took

with them the knowledge concerning customers that 1•as also
known by other competitors.
respondents that was

found

There was nothing taken by the
to

be

confidential or proprie:

The sales books that were thrown away only contained in£orrr'
that respondents, appellant, and competitors had access to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-28-

through other means.

The personal handwritten notes taken and

returned contained similar information.

The present case is

very dissimilar from those cases cited by appellant and the
court below correctly determined that the above action by
respondentsdid not constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty or
unfair competition.
It is apparent from appellant's brief that there are
d:

conflicting inferences that can be drawn from the record.
However, those inferences drawn by the court below were reasonable to justify its conclusions.

Pertaining to making conclu-

sions and inferences the court in Duane Jones, supra at page
245, had the following to say:
"If conflicting inferences are possible as
to abuse or opportunity, the trier of the
facts must make the choice between them.
There can be no revision in this court
unless the choice is clearly wrong."
The tr1al

court's choice of inferences and conclusions made

were clearly right and supported by the record.
Appellant relies upon Lockwood Grader Corp. v.
Backhaus 129 Colo. 339, 270 P.2d 193 (1954), to establish the
elements of a civil conspiracy.

The court in that case con-

sidered all the elements together in deciding that a conspiracy
did not exist and suggested that each element needs to be
related to the other

elements.

In the present case the

evidence supports the lower courts findings of no conspiracy
for the reason that although a few of the elements were present
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there was no connecting relationship.

In regards to

the~

element that more than one person needs to be involved itu
evident that Zarbock negotiated with each of the other resp 1
ents which would satisfy this element, but the object of th<
combined act of negotiations was for future employment and r.
an unlawful act.

Zarbock and Dahle did discuss the feasabi:

of increasing Plumbers Supply waterwork' s business but agair, 1
object was for future employment and the discussions were not
unlawful.

The respondents did terminate the same day, but L

was not unlawful as discussed above, and the fact that they c)
two weeks notice and continued to assist appellant indicates!
the object was not to injure or destroy appellant's business.
The second element is that there needs to be an
object to be accomplished.

Appellant suggests that the objer

was to destroy its ability to compete but this is neither sur·

ported by the evidence nor is it connected with the other eld

Maser's diversion of a valve order and his objective appear :I
record, but although his act was a breach of good faith it •,;a

an independant act not known of by any other respondent priori
termination.

The failure of Dahle to direct Bountiful City::

purchase the meters from appellant was also an independant ac
I'

These two independant acts neither support a conspiracy nor·
alleged object since appellant could still submit bids and
obtain orders from the customers involved.
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The third eleMent that there be a neeting of the minds
on the object is not supported by the findings.

There was a

meeting of the minds in regards to the form notice and the time
of giving two weeks notice but these acts were not unlawful as
shown above and there was no

finding

appellant's ability to com?ete.

that

they affected

The only apparent unlawful acts,

the fourth element, were the t•·1o independant acts discussed
above.

The disposing of the sales hooks \vere independant acts

and although they should have been returned therewas no finding
that the information lost was

either confidential

or non-replace

ableorthatitdidaffect appellant's ability to compete.
The last element mentioned in the Lockl.·mod case is
that the damages must be a proximate result of conspiracy.

This

element also fails in the present case for the reason that the
only proximate dar.tage found by the lower court
two independant acts for

~Vhich

There is no finding

~Vas

due to the

the lower court awarded damages.
to support appellant's contention

that its loss of business or ability to compete was a proximate
result of respondents disposing of the sales books, taking
their handwritten notes, negotiating \vi th Zarbock, or sending
the form notice.

The loss of its business was due to the loss

of its employees which act was lawful and encouraged by appellant.
Further, availability to compete was based on the availability
of its suppliers and the opportunities of bidding for jobs,
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neither of which were affected by any acts of the responden•
(memo decision page 3) .
The findings further substantiate

the conclusion t:

by the court below that appellant failed to sustain the

bur~

of proof resting upon it to prove all elements of a conspira
by a preponderance of the evidence

(see Lockwood, suura, ,.

196).

Perhaps respondents could have changed their e!'lplc
rnent in a different manner but the acts done to effectuate •:
change were more a result of misunderstanding or mistake tha:
that of conspiracy.

This court recognized this in

at 91 \vhere it was stated in regard to acts of

Hoggan,~

solicitatio~·:

to termination that:
" ••• we would prefer to use the term 'misunderstanding' or 'mistake' as to fealty
to that of 'conspiracy.'
Hany people are
victims of an honest misunderstanding of
their rights under a contract.
This seems
to be the kind of a case where an ounce of
legal advice may have been worth a pound of
judicial cure,--but strangely enough, the
most honorable of people shun the doctor and
die of cancer and others stay away from
lawyers only to visit the referee in bankruptcy."

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT APPELLANT i·i.\:
NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER DM1AGES FOR LOST PROFITS.
The lower court in its meno decision correctlY
analyzed the evidence presented when it stated on page):
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within its water works division were
greatly reduced in the months of May and
June, 1976 after the four defendants constituting its water works division staff
left its employment on April 30, 1976, but
this was due to the fact that with its
sales force gone its ability to make sales
became almost nil until new or other employees could be hired or transferred to
handle its business, but the fact that
defendants left to go to work for a competing company does not render defendants
liable ~o plaintiff for its loss of business. The same result would have occurred
regardless of what these four employees
would have done after leaving plaintiff."
It seems equitable to award damages for losses that
are the "natural and probable results of wrongful acts"
appellant contends and its cites infer.
finding nor is

as

However, there is no

there evidence that appellant's reduction in

business was a result of any cause other than their loss of
employees.

Appellant's own witness, Mr. Stinson, concluded

that appellant's loss of sales was due to a loss of employees
and had appellant replaced said employees the loss would have
been greatly reduced.

The damage issue in the present case

is somewhat different from the Hoggan and Duane Jones cases
where the losses were directly attributed to the solicitation
and taking of confidential accounts prior to termination.

In

the present case the soliciation was after termination and the
customers were not confidential.

As mentioned above there was

insufficient evidence to establish a conspiracy or to establish
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damages as a proximate result of respondents acts.

Responde:

neither used any propria tary information to compete, nor wer'
the loss of the sales books and handwritten notes a cause of
any loss of sales.

Of greater importance is the fact thatn

jobs in progress of appellant were affected or lost due to
respondents acts.
Not only does the evidence show that appellant's k
of profits

~

not

the proximate result of any wrongful act

of the respondents, but also that said damages were not
established with reasonable certainty.

The law is well settl,

that there can be no recovery if losses are uncertain, conje:·
tural or speculative (15 Am Jur, Damages Sec. 150, 157). On
this point in U. S. v. Griffith, C.A. Utah, 210 F 2d 11 at
p. 13; the court stated:
"The actual damages which 1vill sustain a
judgment must be established, not by conjectures or unwarranted estimates of
witnesses, but by facts from which
their existence is logically and legally
infereable. The speculations, guesses,
estimates of witnesses, form no better
basis of recovery than the speculations
of the jury themselves."
Appellants witness, Hr. Stinson, arrived at his estimates of!
losses by the appelant by means of a formula that did not ta.•.
into account important variables such as previous year P~~
and whether the loss was a gross figure or a net figure.
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....

His estimates were not" logically and legally inferable".
The lower court's thesis that the same results \vO'.lld
have occurred regardless of what the four employee respondents
would have done after leaving a9pellant is supported by the
evidence.

Respondents were not the only ones "around to com-

pete" and the evidence is clear that all the other competitors
called on the same customers and submitted bids on the same
jobs.

The cause of appellant's loss of business was not due

to outside competition specifically by the respondents but
appellant's own failure to retain the respondents for two
weeks while replacements were secured and trained which would
have lessened the effect that any competitor would have on
appellant's business.
Appellant has no basis for additional compensatory
damages as the lower court correctly found.

Any additional

loss suffered by appellant was due to their own acts or the
consequence of the competitive business in which they were
involved.
POINT

V

APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
It is clear that punitive damages are awarded only
when the conduct is done willfully and maliciously as was
stated by this court in Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 379
P.2d 380 (1963), cited by the appellant.

The court below
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correctly viewed the evidence which indicated that the
sions of the two orders although
iciously or with willful intent.

im~roper

dh~

were not done mal·

Dahle was contacted by

Bountiful City for said meters and had back ordered them fo:
appellant.

It was not with malicious intent that he accept;

the order and filled the same from Plumbers Supply.

Maser

thought the valve might be deleted from the job and antici·
pating possible problems cancelled appellant's order.

Agair

the act of reordering the valve through Plumbers Supply wa;
improper but does not meet the criteria of maliciousness.
Also, these two acts were done independently and as such we:·
not part of a conspiracy to injure.
The only other improper acts found by the lower
court were the throwing av1ay of the incomplete and

replacea~.

sales books and the taking of personal handwritten notes. :
both instances the respondents believed the materials belonc
to them and were of no use to the appellant.

It is evident.

the respondents did not consider their acts wrongful and tha:
there was no element of •.vantoness or bad motive as required
r1ills v. Murray, 472 S.W. 2d 6, 17 S.W. 2d 6,17 (Ho. Al)p.l:·
Also, the mere fact that the lower court approved the granti
of a temporary restraining order based on the fact that the
above mentioned materials were taken does not make it impL:
or even suggestive that the respondents acted 1-vith malice.
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They made a mistake in judgment as to disposition of said
materials.
Appellant cites Southern California Disinfecting
Company v. Lomkins, supra, as an example of punitive oamages
being awarded.

As was pointed out above that case is clearly

distinguishable form the present case in that it involved
fraud and solicitation of confidential customers prior to
termination.
Lomkin

The awarding of exemplary damages in the

case was to discourage fraud and malice which are

not evident in the present case.
As mentioned above respondents neither southt to
damage appellant's ability to compete nor did their acts prior
to termination affect said

ability.

The court below heard all

the testimony and correctly concluded from the actions of the
respondents that there was no justification for an award of
punitive damages.
su~~Y

The present case is a case at law.
evaluated the evidence and made its findings.

The court belo1q
From those

findings it concluded that no conspiracy existed.

The case law

is clear that those specific facts found by the court below do
not constitute a conspiracy to injure appellant' business.
But even if this court treats this case as one in equity the
conclusion would be the same.

The preponderance of the evidence

supports and substantiates that conclusion.
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Appellant concedes in its brief and the

findi~s

establishes the fact that appellant's customers and
were not confidential or propritary information.

suppl~

Therefore.

any solicitation of said customers and suppliers after

re~

pondents' termination .,.,as not unfair com:r:>etition, and appel·
lant' s loss of business that came from that solicitation
competition was fully justified.

an~

The critical issue then,

presented to this court, is whether the acts of resJ?ondents
prior to termination constituted a conspiracy to injure
appellant's business and whether said acts did in fact

i~u

appellant's business.
As was argued above, the only acts of the :-espond
proved by the evidence found by the court were:
1.

''egotiation for new employment;

2.

Discussions of feasibility;

3.

Sending out form notice;

4.

Giving tv;o weeks notice on same day;

5.

Thrmving away incomplete sales books and an
extra, used and outdated print-out,

6.

Taking and returning personal handwritten not

7.

Independent diversions of two orders;

Nothing else was taken or destroyed by respondents.

It

1vOL

be an unjustified request to require this court or the loi>E
court to fabricate an "iceberg" when the preponderance of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

evidence showed that the alleged "tip" was the entire picture
created partially by a few mistakes in judgment.
The appellant, prior to respondents termination,
dealt

vli th certain customers and suppliers and had jobs in

progress, salesman attempting to secure other jobs, extra
copies of print outs showing the names and addresses of their
customers, other relevant information on jobs in progress,
three catalogs in "''hich to find price and materials and
adequate inventory.

Appellant's status after respondents

termination was not changed except for the reduction of its
sales force.

Appellant still had the same jobs in progress,

they •.vere neither lost nor affected.

It could still bid on

jobs of its customers and obtain materials from its suppliers,
and it still had all the necessary information to continue its
business.

It is true that one of its competitors had increased

itscompetition by hiring some of the respondents but where
there is no agreement of non competition the court and our
society adhere to a strong policy favoring free competition in
the economic sphere.
The facts of this case and the holdings of the courts
in the cases cited by appellant and respondents

clearly

demonstrate that respondents did not conspire to injure appellant's business and although they ~ade a few mistakes in judgment
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as they winded up their affairs with appellant, those mistake!
neither affected appellant's ability to compete nor caused
appellant to lose business.

Appellant has been awarded

judgment for the only damages that proximately resulted from
respondents acts while employed by appellant.

Appellant sh

be denied any further relief and the judgment of the lmver
court should be affirmed.

Respectfully subMitted,

ICHARD S. NEMELKA
Attorney at Law
455 East Fourth South
Suite 401
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone:
521-8733

84111
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